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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress embarked on a new era in the
regulation of interstate commerce when it created the Interstate
Commerce Commission ("ICC") in 1887 to regulate railroad traffic.' A
major purpose of the ICC regulatory framework, as amended by the
Transportation Act of 1920,2 was to preempt actions by state and local
authorities that prevented railroads from abandoning unprofitable
1. See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11901 (1994)).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
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lines.3 When Congress passed the Transportation Act, 252,588 miles
of track criss-crossed the United States;4 by 1990 the number of rail-
way miles had decreased by almost half.5
Although the relative ease with which railroads abandoned
unprofitable lines augmented their profitability, state and local gov-
ernments realized that corridors assembled in the mid-nineteenth
century were extremely expensive to reassemble once abandoned.6
Local authorities began considering other public uses for railroad
rights-of-way, such as roads or highways, the placement of utility
lines, or recreational trails.7
In an effort to conserve railway corridors as a national re-
source, both for future transportation use and for current use as rec-
reational trails, Congress included unique provisions within the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("4-R
Act")8 and the National Trails Systems Act Amendments of 1983
("Rails-to-Trails Act"). 9 Specifically, the Rails-to-Trails Act asserted
federal control over the disposition of abandoned railroad rights-of-
way and promoted alternative uses for railway corridors. 1°
The abandonment of rail service on a railway line requires the
approval of the Surface Transportation Board ("STB"), the successor
to the ICC. 11 Until the STB grants such approval, the railway line is
considered part of the national transportation system.12 The require-
ment of STB approval can present a direct conflict with state property
law. What is the result when a railroad right-of-way, held by the
railroad in the form of an easement, has purportedly been abandoned
under state property law before the STB has given permission to
abandon rail service? Does the easement terminate, thereby dispos-
sessing the railroad (or the railroad's successor) of its property inter-
est, or does federal law perpetuate the easement under the jurisdic-
3. See 1 I.L. SEARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 6 (The Commonwealth
Fund 1969) (1931) (discussing purpose of ICC).
4. See MICHAEL CONANT, RAILROAD MERGERS AND ABANDONMENTS 113 (1964) (using ICC
statistics).
5. Justice Brennan estimated that 272,000 miles of track existed in 1920, and that the
total amount in use had shrunk to 141,000 by 1990. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990).
6. See Charles H. Montange, Conserving Rail Corridors, 10 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
139, 139-40 (1991) (discussing the abandonment process and the possibility of preserving rail
corridors).
7. See id.
8. Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 17, 90 Stat. 31, 144-46 (1976).
9. Pub. L. No. 98-11, § 208, 97 Stat. 42, 48 (1983) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1247(d) (Supp. II 1996)).
10. Id.
11. See 49 U.S.C § 10903 (1994).
12. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1990).
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tion of the STB, thus preserving the right-of-way for future
transportation use? If the easement continues to exist, does the
establishment of a recreational trail upon the railroad easement
constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment?
This Note addresses these questions and advocates, despite a
recent Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decision to the contrary,13 that
railroad rights-of-way should not be considered abandoned pursuant
to state property law while the rail corridor is still subject to the
jurisdiction of the STB. The proposition that federal law preempts
state law in this situation is supported by explicit congressional
intent to subordinate state property law, and is founded on the
Supremacy Clause and the federal government's power to regulate
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. In addition, this
Note concludes that the perpetuation by federal law of an easement
underlying a railroad right-of-way-and the establishment of a
recreational trail upon the easement-should not constitute a taking
of property from the owner of the servient estate under the Fifth
Amendment.
Part II.A of this Note briefly presents the history of railroad
abandonments and the extent to which federal law regulates the
abandonment of rail service and rights-of-way, specifically addressing
the preemption of state law by federal railroad regulation. Part II.B
discusses the federal efforts to preserve railway corridors for future
transportation use that culminated in the Rails-to-Trails Act in 1983.
Part II.C discusses the effect of the Rails-to-Trails Act on state prop-
erty law and outlines current takings jurisprudence under the Fifth
Amendment, examining both the traditional physical occupation
analysis under Loretto and regulatory takings under the Penn Central
test.
Part III examines the conflict between federal and state law
within the context of a recent railroad abandonment case. This
section describes the misapplication of federal and state law by the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Preseault v. United States,
specifically addressing the court's analysis of the abandonment issue
and the takings claim. Part IV advocates a more consistent approach,
in line with express statutory language, congressional intent, and the
Constitution, to determine when abandonment occurs and whether
the result is a taking. Part V concludes the discussion.




II. FEDERAL RAILROAD REGULATION
A. Federal Regulation of Railroad Abandonments
Congress first asserted control over railroad abandonments to
prevent states from forcing railroads to maintain.unprofitable lines.
Although Congress likely did not contemplate that state law would be
used to force railroads to abandon unprofitable lines at the time it
conferred on the ICC the power to regulate abandonments, the same
authority that precludes state law from hindering abandonments
should also apply to efforts under state law forcing abandonments.
Courts faced with the issue have so held. 14 A contrary conclusion
would be inconsistent with the federal government's power to regulate
interstate commerce.
Prior to 1920, railroad operators desiring to vacate service on
an unprofitable line were faced with numerous obstacles to
abandonment, including contractual obligations, limitations imposed
by state railroad charters, and restrictive laws imposed by state
legislatures. 15  Railroads were effectively compelled to maintain
unprofitable lines as a result of the myriad difficulties encountered at
the state level, forcing many into financial straits and limiting access
to needed capital.'i As a partial remedy, Congress included provisions
within the Transportation Act of 1920 expanding the power of the
federal government through the ICC to regulate railroad
abandonments. 7 Under the power of the Commerce Clause8 and the
14. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Nor may state
law cause a reverter of a right-of-way prior to an ICC-approved abandonment."); Louisiana &
Arkansas Ry. Co. v. Bickham, 602 F. Supp. 383, 384 (M.D. La. 1985), affd, 775 F.2d 300 (5th
Cir. 1985) (noting that state common law is not operable prior to ICC abandonment).
15. See Steven R. Wild, A History of Railroad Abandonments, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 2-4
(1995) (examining challenges to railroad abandonments).
16. See id. at 4.
17. See Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 402,41 Stat. 456,477 (1920) ("[N]o carrier by
railroad subject to this Act shall abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad, or operation
therof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate
that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit such an abandonment.").
18. The Commerce Clause states: "The Congress shall have the power ... to regulate
commerce.., among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Thus, interstate
transportation facilitating commerce falls within congressional power:
Within its own sphere ... the Commission, like the Congress to which it owes its
existence and authority, is supreme: its powers over interstate commerce are plenary
and exclusive. Because the identical instruments of transportation serve both local and
national needs, and because the flow of traffic is not guided by the artificial political
lines which separate the states, the effective regulation of interstate commerce has
necessitated increasingly frequent incursions upon the rights of states.
1402 [Vol. 51:1399
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Supremacy Clause,19 the Transportation Act of 1920 preempted exist-
ing state law. As a result, railroads could abandon unprofitable lines,
with the authorization of the ICC, despite the protests of local
authorities. 20 The Supreme Court has justified federal preemption on
the theory that the costs associated with maintaining and operating
unprofitable intrastate lines stifled interstate commerce by raising
rates across the board.21 Presumably, Congress recognized that state
restrictions prevented railroads from efficiently allocating their lim-
ited capital, thereby harming rail operators and shippers alike. As a
result of the Transportation Act of 1920, state law impacting railroads
is subordinate to the federal duty of interstate railroads to efficiently
"render transportation services in interstate commerce."22
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick &
Tile Co.2 best illustrates the preemption doctrine in the context of
SCHARFMAN, supra note 3, at 5.
19. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The Supremacy Clause mandates the preemption of state laws that "interfere with, or are
contrary to the laws of Congress." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
However, the Court does not favor preemption of state law unless either "the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or... Congress has unmistakably so
ordained." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). Thus
"[w~hen Congress has chosen to legislate pursuant to its constitutional powers, then a court
must find local law pre-empted by federal regulation whenever the challenged state statute
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'" Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981)
(quoting Perez v. Campbell 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971)).
20. See SHARFMAN, supra note 3, at 6; see also Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U.S.
404, 408 (1925) ("there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce.., the acts of
Congress on that subject are supreme and exclusive.").
21. The Supreme Court has stated that:
One way [to inhibit interstate commerce] is by excessive expenditures from the common
fund in the local interest, thereby lessening the ability of the carrier properly to serve
interstate commerce. Expenditures in the local interest may be so large as to compel
the carrier to raise reasonable interstate rates, or to abstain from making an
appropriate reduction of such rates, or to curtail interstate service, or to forego facilities
needed in interstate commerce. Likewise, excessive local expenditures may so weaken
the financial condition of the carrier as to raise the cost of securing capital required for
providing transportation facilities used in the service, and thus compel an increase of
rates. Such depletion of the common resources in the local interest may conceivably be
effected by continued operation of an intrastate branch in intrastate commerce at a
large loss.
Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 163 (1926).
22. Id. at 165.
23. 450 U.S. 311 (1981).
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railroad abandonments. After a mudslide damaged a 5.6 mile branch
line, the rail carrier applied for and received a certificate of abandon-
ment for the branch line from the ICC.24 Kalo Brick, the only shipper
still using the line, objected and commenced an action in state court
alleging that the railroad had violated both Iowa statutes regulating
railroads and state common law by refusing to provide cars on the
branch line, failing to maintain the line, and tortiously interfering
with contractual relations.25 Overruling the state's highest court, the
Supreme Court disallowed the claims under state law and concluded
that state laws in conflict with federal railroad regulation were inap-
plicable because the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over railroad
abandonments. 26 Logically, state property law that encroaches on the
authority of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce
should be subject to the same principle the Supreme Court applied to
state railroad and tort law in Kalo Brick.
Preemption of state restrictions greatly benefited railroad
operators and facilitated the abandonment of thousands of miles of
track; between 1920 and 1963 the ICC permitted the abandonment of
almost 50,000 miles of track, approximately one-fifth of the total
miles of track existing in 1920.27 Rising labor costs and increased
competition from truckers, however, continued to push many
railroads towards bankruptcy.28 The government responded with the
4-R Act 29 and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,30 streamlining the
abandonment process while retaining the ICC's ultimate authority
over abandonments.
Under current law, a railroad may not abandon a railway line
or discontinue service on the line3i without requesting and receiving
24. See id. at 313-14.
25. See id. at 314-15.
26. See id. at 323 ("In sum, the construction of the applicable federal law is straightfor-
ward and unambiguous. Congress granted to the Commission plenary authority to regulate, in
the interest of interstate commerce, rail carriers' cessations of service on their lines. And at
least as to abandonments, this authority is exclusive.").
27. See CONANT, supra note 4, at 113.
28. See id. at 116 (discussing labor costs); Wild, supra note 15, at 6-7 (discussing competi-
tion).
29. Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 17, 90 Stat. 31, 144, 146 (1976).
30. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
31. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1990), stating:
There is an important distinction in the Interstate Commerce Act between
"abandonment" of a rail line and "discontinuance" of service.... Once a carrier
"abandons" a rail line pursuant to authority granted by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the line is no longer part of the national transportation system, and
although the Commission is empowered to impose conditions on abandonments,... as a
general proposition ICC jurisdiction terminates.... In contrast, "discontinuance"
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the approval of the STB.3 2 Approval by the STB requires a finding
that "present or future public convenience and necessity require or
permit the abandonment or discontinuance."33 In making the finding,
the STB will take into account "whether the abandonment or
discontinuance will have a serious, adverse impact on rural and
community development."34  Thus, almost 80 years after the
enactment of the Transportation Act of 1920, abandonment of a rail
line still requires a definite, affirmative act by the operator and
approval by the federal government.
B. Federal Efforts to Preserve Rail Corridors
Concerned with the shrinking number of rail miles resulting
from the relentless pace with which railroads continued to abandon
rail lines,35 Congress included within the 4-R Act several provisions
aimed at preserving rail corridors, including: (1) the requirement
that the Secretary of Transportation prepare a report on the
alternative uses of abandoned railroad rights-of-way; (2)
authorization for the Secretary of the Interior to encourage conversion
to recreational uses; and (3) authorization for the ICC to delay
disposition of abandoned corridors unless the property has first been
offered on reasonable terms for public purposes, including
recreational uses.36
Congress further strengthened the federal government's ability
to preserve abandoned corridors by enacting the National Trails
authority allows a railroad to cease operating a line for an indefinite period while
preserving the rail corridor for possible reactivation of service in the future.
32. See 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (1994).
33. 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d).
34. Id.
35. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. at 5 (discussing Congress's concern with "shrinking rail
trackage").
36. See 49 U.S.C. § 10905 (1994). This provision states:
When the Board approves an application to abandon or discontinue under section 10903,
the Board shall find whether the rail properties that are involved in the proposed
abandonment or discontinuance are appropriate for use for public purposes, including
highways, other forms of mass transportation, conservation, energy production or
transmission, or recreation. If the Board finds that the rail properties proposed to be
abandoned are appropriate for public purposes and not required for continued rail
operations, the properties may be sold, leased, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of only
under conditions provided in the order of the Board. The conditions may include a
prohibition on any such disposal for a period of not more than 180 days after the
effective date of the order, unless the properties have first been offered, on reasonable
terms, for sale for public purposes.
14051998]
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Systems Act Amendments of 1983. 37 Known as the Rails-to-Trails Act
(or as the federal railbanking statute), the statute continues where
the 4-R Act leaves off, encouraging local entities "to establish trails on
abandoned railroad corridors in furtherance of the national policy to
preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of
rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage
energy efficient transportation use."38 The statute prohibits the STB
from permitting abandonment inconsistent with interim trail use if a
public or private organization is willing to assume management re-
sponsibility and legal liability for a corridor. 9 Thus, Congress has
shifted the cost of maintaining railroad corridors for "future reactiva-
tion of rail service" from railroad operators to trail users.40 Implicitly,
the trail user is further obligated to "maintain the linear integrity of
the corridor" so that reactivation of rail service is possible.41
Significantly, the statute provides that "such interim use shall
not be treated, for the purposes of any law or rule of law, as an aban-
donment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes."
42
Whereas earlier statutes regulating railroad abandonments focused
exclusively on preempting state law governing the abandonment of
rail service, the clear language of the Rails-to-Trails Act indicates
Id.
37. Pub. L. No. 98-11, § 208, 97 Stat. 42, 48 (1983) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1247(d) (Supp. H 1996)).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (Supp. H 1996) states in full:
The Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Surface Transportation Board,
and the Secretary of the Interior, in administering the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 [45 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq.], shall encourage State and
local agencies and private interests to establish appropriate trails using the provisions of
such programs. Consistent with the purposes of that Act, and in furtherance of the
national policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of
rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient
transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way
pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent with this
chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad
purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as
an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. If a State,
political subdivision, or qualified private organization is prepared to assume full
responsibility for management of such rights-of-way and for any legal liability arising
out of such transfer or use, and for the payment of any and all taxes that may be levied
or assessed against such rights-of-way, then the Board shall impose such terms and
conditions as a requirement of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a manner
consistent with this chapter, and shall not permit abandonment or discontinuance
inconsistent or disruptive of such use.
39. See id. The application process for interim trail use and maintenance of a railbanked
line under the jurisdiction of the ICC are set out in ICC regulations at 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29
(1997).
40. Id.
41. Montange, supra note 6, at 155.
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added).
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Congress's intent to preempt state property law governing the aban-
donment of right-of-way easements. The legislative history estab-
lishes that the purpose of the Rails-to-Trails Act is to prevent the
operation of state law from destroying railroad corridors originally
established by easement.
43
C. The Effect of the Rails-to-Trails Act on State Property Law
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation." The
Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the Takings Clause is
to prevent the government from shifting public burdens onto private
landowners. 45 In implementing the Takings Clause, however, the
Supreme Court has developed two strands of analysis depending upon
whether the claim is one for a permanent physical taking (also known
as a per se taking) or for a regulatory taking.
46
A permanent physical taking is any permanent occupation of
private property by the government or any permanent occupation
facilitated by the government for which compensation is not paid.47
The modern case defining a permanent physical taking is Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., which concerned a New York
City ordinance requiring apartment building owners to allow
installation of cable television lines in return for the payment of one
43. See H.R. REP. No. 98-28, at 8-9 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 112, 119-20.
The report notes:
The key finding of this amendment is that interim use of a railroad right-of-way for trail
use, when the route itself remains intact for future railroad purposes, shall not
constitute an abandonment of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. This finding
alone should eliminate many of the problems with this program. The concept of
attempting to establish trails only after the formal abandonment of a railroad right-of-
way is self-defeating; once a right-of-way is abandoned for railroad purposes there may
be nothing left for trail use. This amendment would ensure that potential interim trail
use will be considered prior to abandonment. If interim use of an established railroad
right-of-way consistent with the National Trails System Act is feasible.., then the
route will not be ordered abandoned.
Id.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
45. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (noting that Takings Clause
was "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
46. See Dennis H. Long, Note, The Expanding Importance of Temporary Physical Takings:
Some Unresolved Issues and the Opportunity for New Directions in Takings Law, 72 IND. L.J.
1185 (1997) (describing the two branches of takings analysis and advocating the recognition of a
third branch of temporary physical takings).
47. The Supreme Court first recognized permanent physical takings in Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 176-78 (1871).
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dollar per apartment.48  Despite the minimal invasion of private
property, the Court found a permanent physical taking and required
the payment of compensation.49 In addition to actual physical occupa-
tion, government actions that "eliminate an essential element of
property ownership" may also be per se takings.50
Regulatory takings, on the other hand, lack clear definition
and afford greater deference to government actions. Regulatory
takings were not recognized by the Court until Justice Holmes de-
clared in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that while government
regulation of private property is generally permissible, "if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."51 The Court defined "too
far" in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City through a
three-prong balancing test focusing on the following factors: (1) the
character of the governmental action; (2) the economic impact on the
property owner; and (3) the interference with the landowner's distinct
investment-backed expectations. 52 The Supreme Court has also found
regulatory takings in cases involving the forced granting of easements
pursuant to land use regulations. 53 Moreover, the Court has held that
when extreme regulation of private property results in almost
complete destruction of the economic value of the property (a confisca-
tory regulatory taking), the Court will treat the deprivation as a per
se taking.5
4
48. 458 U.S. 419, 421-24 (1982).
49. See id. at 434-38. The point was reiterated by the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992), when the Court stated that "[iun general (at least
with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how
weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation."
50. JAMEs W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 149 (2d ed. 1998).
51. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
52. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
53. Two cases involving regulatory exactions are worth noting because they show that the
Court will find regulatory takings when easements are taken for public use. In both Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994), regulations forcing landowners to grant an easement for public purposes in return for
building permits without compensation were found unconstitutional. For three reasons,
however, the analysis is not helpful in the context of establishing recreational trails under the
Rails-to-Trails Act. First, both cases arose in the context of local land use regulation as opposed
to federal regulation of interstate commerce under the Constitution. Second, both cases
involved a quid pro quo, in which the landowners were asked to relinquish exclusive control
over portions of their property in return for the right to utilize their land, something they
arguably already had the right to do. Third, the cases involved the dedication of new easements
for public use, as opposed to the maintenance of an already existing easement under federal
jurisdiction.
54. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. Justice Scalia also noted, however, that "[w]here
'permanent physical occupation' of land is concerned, we have refused to allow the government
to decree it anew (without compensation), no matter how weighty the asserted 'public interests'
involved... though we assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent ease-
1408
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Because of the inherent conflict between federal and state law,
controversy frequently surrounds the status of an abandoned railway
corridor when potential trail operators seek to preserve the corridor.
Federal jurisdiction over the property interest underlying the railroad
right-of-way is important, however, only when the railroad holds the
right-of-way in the form of an easement. When railroads (or their
successors) hold railway corridors in fee simple, railroads abandoning
service on their lines can dispose of their property as they wish,
including selling or leasing the corridor for trail use. An owner in fee
simple cannot abandon her property interest, no "reversion" of prop-
erty to the previous property owners can occur, and no issue of a
taking under the Fifth Amendment arises. Problems often arise,
however, when the railroad seeks to dispose of a right-of-way held in
the form of an easement.55
Under state common law, express easements are nonposses-
sory interests in land owned by another, created by a granting docu-
ment such as a deed.56 The owner of the land subject to the easement
is the holder of the servient estate.5 7 Although generally granted in
perpetuity,58 easements are often granted for a particular purpose.
Easements granted for a particular purpose will normally terminate
when the purpose for which the easement was granted no longer
exists, eliminating "meaningless burdens" on land. 9 Easements will
also terminate when they are abandoned by the easement holder.
Courts applying state common law will find abandonment, however,
only when the clear intent to abandon the easement is coupled with
ment that was a pre-existing limitation upon the landowner's title." Id. at 1028-29. This
language seems to indicate that further restrictions on land due to a preexisting easement
would not be a taking.
55. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
The court stated:
Clearly, if the Railroad obtained fee simple title to the land over which it was to operate,
and that title inures, as it would, to its successors, the Preseaults today would have no
right or interest in those parcels and could have no claim related to those parcels for a
taking. If, on the other hand, the Railroad acquired only easements for use, easements
imposed on the property owners' underlying fee simple estates, and if those easements
were limited to uses that did not include public recreational hiking and biking
trails ... or if the easements prior to their conversion to trails had been extinguished by
operation of law leaving the property owner with unfettered fee simples, the argument
of the Preseaults [that a taking has occurred] becomes viable.
Id.
56. See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN
LAND, 11 1.01, 3.04 (rev. ed. 1995 & Supp. 1998) (defining an easement and describing an
express grant).
57. See id. at 1 2.02 (describing servient estate).
58. See id. at 1 10.01 (describing duration of easements).
59. Id. at 1 10.03 (describing cessation of purpose doctrine).
14091998]
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acts that clearly evidence the intent to abandon; mere non-use of an
easement will not amount to abandonment. 6
0
The Rails-to-Trails Act prevents the termination of railroad
easements in two ways. First, by stipulating the continuation of the
purpose for which the easement was created (future railroad use), the
Rails-to-Trails Act prevents termination through the cessation of
purpose doctrine. Second, by stating that interim trail use will not
constitute abandonment of the easement, the Act prevents termina-
tion through abandonment. 61
Two points concerning the nature of easements in general and
of railroad easements in particular are important to the analysis of
whether the Rails-to-Trails Act effects a taking without just compen-
sation. First, contrary to the language used in many decisions on
rails-to-trails conversions,62 there is no "reversionary" interest in an
easement.63 Unlike a leasehold, life estate, fee simple determinable,
or fee simple subject to a condition subsequent-where the estate
created is granted for a limited time or is terminated upon the occur-
rence or nonoccurrence of a specified event, and is granted simultane-
ously with a future interest 64-easements are generally granted in
perpetuity.65 Easements are nonpossessory interests in land that do
not create simultaneous future interests in the grantor or a third
party. An easement does not "revert" to the owner of the servient
estate by operation of law in the same manner as a future interest.66
The perpetuation of an easement pursuant to federal law, therefore,
does not destroy or "take" a future interest without just compensa-
tion. Instead, the owner of the servient estate continues to hold the
land in fee simple subject to an easement for railroad purposes.
60. See id. at 10.05 (describing termination by abandonment).
61. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (Supp. I 1996).
62. See, e.g., Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1990) (discussing reversionary interests);
id. at 20 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); Lawson v. State, 730 P.2d 1308, 1316 (Wash. 1986)
(en banc) (holding unconstitutional a statute enabling a government to acquire existing
"reversionary" rights without compensation).
63. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 703 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that
because an easement is a "servitude," it is inaccurate to speak of an easement as "reverting").
64. The future interest created by a leasehold is known as a reversion. The future inter-
est in a life estate is typically known as the reversion or remainder interest, depending on
whether the future interest will pass to the original owner or a third party. The future interest
created by a fee simple determinable is known as a possibility of reverter, while the future
interest created by a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is known as a right of entry or
power of termination. See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
MODERN PROPERTY LAW 268-71 (3d ed. 1994).
65. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 56, at 10.01 (describing duration of easements).
66. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(explaining the difference between reversion and relief from the burden of an easement).
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The second point to consider is the specific nature of a railroad
easement. Normally, an easement granted at common law allows the
servient owner to utilize the easement as long as she does not inter-
fere with the use of the easement by the dominant owner.67 Thus, for
example, both a landowner and her neighbor can utilize a right-of-way
granted to the neighbor to cross the owner's land, as long as the land-
owner does not interfere with her neighbor's use.
A railroad easement is different. In the interest of safety,
among other reasons, a railroad easement is an exclusive use ease-
ment. In other words, a railroad right-of-way easement granted by a
landowner cannot be used by the landowner for any reason, even if
the use does not interfere with the use by the easement holder.68
Servient owners, for example, cannot build a grade-level driveway
across a railroad easement without permission from the easement
holder.6 9 Thus, railroad easements are among the most burdensome
of easements, especially as compared to easements used for interim
recreational trails, where the owner can use her land.0 Arguments
that interim trail use of an easement held for future railroad purposes
is more burdensome than the original railroad easement are not
persuasive, especially given the additional danger of rail traffic.7 1
Before and after conversion to trail use, the servient landowners own
their land in fee simple subject to a railroad easement under the ju-
risdiction of the STB.
67. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 56, at 1 1.01 (discussing use of an easement).
68. See State v. Preseault, 652 A.2d 1001, 1003 (Vt. 1994) ("It is well settled under
Vermont law that the holder of a railroad easement enjoys the right to the exclusive occupancy
of the land, and has the right to exclude all concurrent occupancy in any mode and for any
purpose .... Indeed, the right of a railroad to the exclusive occupancy of a railroad easement is
said to be virtually the same as that of an owner in fee.") (citations omitted).
69. See Danaya C. Wright, Private Rights and Public Ways: Property Disputes and Rails-
To.Trails in Indiana, 30 IND. L. REV. 723, 759 n.149 (1997) (noting Preseault's required
approval of easement holder to build driveway). See also Anna Wilde Mathews, Safety:
Railroads Take Heat for Pedestrian Fatalities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1998, at BI (noting that rail
lines are private property and pedestrians are trespassers).
70. See State v. Preseault, 652 A.2d at 1004 (noting that servient owners can use a nature
trail to the same extent as the general public).
71. See Mathews, supra note 69 (noting that trains killed 539 pedestrians in 1997, more
deaths than in U.S. plane crashes, and that an additional 510 pedestrians were injured). The
article does not include the additional people killed crossing tracks in their automobiles. See
also Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Minn. 1983) (finding
that trail use imposes no additional burden); Montange, supra note 6, at 158 (1991) (arguing
trail use less burdensome); Roger M. Stahl, Comment, Smoke Along the Tracks: The
Constitutionality of Converting Rails-To-Trails Under 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), 16 WM. MITCHELL L.




III. PRESEAULT V. UNITED STATES
A. Background
Preseault v. United States72 presents a unique set of facts
within which to examine the nexus of federal and state law in the
operation of the Rails-to-Trails Act. The issue of abandonment espe-
cially depends on the correct application of federal law, while the
takings issue is a separate, but derivative, problem.
The Preseaults owned a piece of land in Vermont in fee sim-
ple.73 A railroad right-of-way ran over the tract, which was comprised
of three previously distinct parcels. 74 The right-of-way was initially
acquired by the Rutland-Canadian Railroad in 1899. 75 Both the un-
derlying properties and the rights-of-way passed through several
subsequent owners.76 The Preseaults purchased the property in two
separate transactions, the first in 1966 and the second in 1980. 77 In
1962 the State of Vermont acquired the right-of-way from the Rutland
Railway Corporation (the successor to the Rutland-Canadian
Railroad) when the company was liquidated, and leased the right-of-
way to the Vermont Railway, Inc.78 By 1970, the Vermont Railway
ceased all transport activities over the rails and utilized the right-of-
way only for the storage of railroad cars.79 In 1975, the Vermont
Railway removed all switches and tracks from the portion of the right-
of-way crossing the land owned by the Preseaults.80
In 1981, in proceedings that eventually reached the Supreme
Court of Vermont, the Preseaults sued for quiet title to the land un-
derlying the railroad right-of-way.8' The Vermont Supreme Court
held that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over the Vermont
Railway due to the pervasive federal regulation of interstate railroads
by the ICC, and therefore the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to decide the case.8 2 In effect, the court recognized that
72. 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).




77. See id. at 1537.
78. See Trustees of the Diocese v. State, 496 A.2d 151, 152 (Vt. 1985).
79. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1545.
80. See id.
81. See Trustees of the Diocese, 496 A.2d at 152.
82. See id. at 152-53. "[Clourts are not empowered to make any determination regarding
the issue of abandonment, as such would interfere with the ICC's plenary authority in this
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Congress's power to regulate railroad activity under the Commerce
Clause preempted competing claims under state property law. The
Vermont Supreme Court's decision supports the approach towards
abandonment advocated by this Note.
Unable to obtain relief in state court, the Preseaults then filed
a petition with the ICC seeking a certificate of abandonment.8 The
Vermont Railway and the state of Vermont responded by asking for
discontinuance of rail service (as opposed to abandonment) and the
approval by the ICC of an agreement with the city of Burlington to
lease the right-of-way for interim trail use pursuant to the Rails-to-
Trails Act.8 The ICC approved the state's request and simultane-
ously rejected the Preseaults' petition for a certificate of abandonment
in January of 1986.85
In 1988, the Preseaults appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, contending that the Rails-to-Trails Act
was unconstitutional. The Second Circuit held that the Act was a
valid exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause,
and that the statute did not effect a taking of property without just
compensation under the Takings Clause.86 Specifically, the court held
that the operation of the Rails-to-Trails Act did not effect a taking
because the landowner's "reversionary interest, if any, [was] not post-
poned any more by the operation of § 1247(d) [establishing a trail]
than it could otherwise be affected by the ICC's continuing jurisdic-
tion."sT The court refused to find any distinction between a present
"railroad purpose" and a future purpose, holding that the ICC re-
tained jurisdiction in either case. 88 Thus the Second Circuit appears
to agree with the Supreme Court of Vermont, finding that while ICC
jurisdiction continued the property interests of the Preseaults were
frozen. Only after the ICC released jurisdiction pursuant to an aban-
donment proceeding would state law determine the disposition of the
property interests. The Second Circuit's approach also is consistent
with the approach advocated by this Note.
area." Id. at 154. "The State action here is an attempt to enforce an alleged common law right,
which in this instance would interfere with the laws of Congress. The action thus cannot be
sustained, and the motion to dismiss was properly granted." Id.
83. See Preseault v. ICC, 853 F.2d 145, 147 (2d. Cir. 1988).
84. See id. at 147-48. The agreement between the State of Vermont and the Vermont
Railway as lessors and the City of Burlington as lessee was executed in June of 1985. See
Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1549.
85. See Preseault v. ICC, 853 F.2d at 148.





On certiorari from the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court
affirmed the constitutionality of the Rails-to-Trails Act under the
Commerce Clause, and held that even if exercise of the Act effected a
taking (which the Court did not address), the Act would not be uncon-
stitutional under the Fifth Amendment because it did not prohibit a
remedy under the Tucker Act. 9 The majority's decision as to the
abandonment was clearly and succinctly stated by Justice Brennan:
"State law generally governs the disposition of reversionary interests,
subject of course to the ICC's 'exclusive and plenary' jurisdiction to
regulate abandonments." 0 The Court found that the Rail-to-Trails
Act met the rational basis test; both encouraging trail use and pre-
serving established railroad rights-of-way were reasonably adapted to
congressional objectives. 91 Addressing the takings issue, Justice
Brennan compared the Rails-to-Trails Act to the alternative of direct
federal purchase, construction, and maintenance of recreational trails,
and stated that the Act was less costly to the federal government
because "under any view of takings law, only some rail-to-trail con-
versions will amount to takings. Some rights-of-way are held in fee
simple."92 Though essentially dicta, this statement of Congress's
intent as to cost leaves open the possibility that the Court would find
a taking under the Rails-to-Trails Act. Justice Brennan (the author of
Penn Central) did not intimate, however, whether takings claims
under the Act would be analyzed as per se takings or regulatory tak-
ings.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, joined by Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, also affirmed the Second Circuit, but, unlike the
majority, addressed the takings issue directly. In effect, Justice
O'Connor argued that any modification of state law property rights by
federal regulation would be a taking under the restrictive "permanent
physical occupation" standard.93 Where the Second Circuit held that
ICC jurisdiction prevented the vesting of any property interests in the
Preseaults, Justice O'Connor argued that the Preseaults' property
89. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1990). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(aX1)
(1994), provides that any claim founded on federal law against the federal government to
recover damages is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The Little Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1994), creates concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts for claims
not exceeding $10,000.
90. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. at 8 (citing Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick &
Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 321 (1981)).
91. See id. at 17-18.
92. Id. at 15-16.
93. Id. at 24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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interests were determined without regard to federal law.94 According
to Justice O'Connor, any action by the ICC that delays the enjoyment
of a property interest destroys that interest, because "any other
conclusion would convert the ICC's power to pre-empt conflicting state
regulation of interstate commerce into the power to pre-empt the
rights guaranteed by state property law, a result incompatible with
the Fifth Amendment."95 By implication, any action by the ICC delay-
ing abandonment, not just the establishment of a trail, would consti-
tute a taking. Clearly, Justice O'Connor was unwilling to defer to
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to retain jurisdiction
over a railroad right-of-way preserved for future transportation use.
The Preseaults next sought compensation for a taking under
the Tucker Act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the United
States Claims Court granted partial summary judgment for the
Preseaults, holding that the ICC's exclusive regulatory authority over
abandonment of railroad lines did not preclude abandonment of the
property interest under state property law.9 But the final judgment
of this court (renamed the Court of Federal Claims in the time
between the two judgments) denied the Preseault's claim for
compensation under the Fifth Amendment due to an inability of the
Preseaults to develop an "historically rooted expectation" of
compensation, and dismissed the complaint. 97 Thus, in a seemingly
inconsistent result, the court found abandonment pursuant to state
law, but no taking upon the establishment of the recreational trail on
the abandoned easement.
The decision of the Court of Federal Claims denying recovery
to the Preseaults was initially affirmed by a three judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.98 The Federal
94. "Although the Commission's actions may pre-empt the operation and effect of certain
state laws, those actions do not displace state law as the traditional source of the real property
interests." Id. at 22.
95. Id. (indicating that the interest is destroyed, as opposed to merely suspending or
deferring the vesting of the property rights).
96. See Preseault v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 818, 830-31 (1992). The court quoted exten-
sively from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1990),
criticizing the "flawed analysis" of the Second Circuit. Id.
97. Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 89 (1992). The court stated:
A question of first impression therefore is presented by this case-whether, given long-
standing, pervasive, and specific federal limitations on rights created by state law in
respect of property burdened by a private easement for a public purpose, a landowner
could have developed a historically rooted expectation of compensation for postponement
of those rights when state law does not recognize the rights independent of federal
regulation. The court rules in the negative.
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Circuit subsequently vacated the panel decision, however, and or-
dered that the case be heard en banc.99 The en banc decision, decided
November 5, 1996, is the touchstone of this Note; the legal analysis
embodied in this opinion by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals0 °
will be examined below.
B. The Court's Analysis
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion without a
clear majority,'0  identified three distinct issues relevant to
determining whether a taking had occurred: (1) the nature of the
right-of-way, whether it was in the form of an easement or a fee
simple estate; (2) if an easement, whether the scope of the easement
permitted use as a recreational trail; and (3) whether the easement
had been abandoned. 102 The first issue is exclusively one of state
law.103 Without the finding of an easement under Vermont law, the
second and third issues are moot; an entity that owns a railroad right-
of-way in fee simple is not subject to the claims of adjacent
landowners and can dispose of its property as it chooses. 1°4 The court
found the right-of-way to be in the form of an easement.
The court also resolved the second and third issues, concerning
the scope and abandonment of the easement, by reference to state
98. See Preseault v. United States, Nos. 93-5067, 5068, 1995 WL 544703, at *1 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 14, 1995), vacated and withdrawn, 66 F.3d 1190, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The three judge
panel stated:
We hold appellants' interests will become possessory only if and when the ICC approves
abandonment of the rights-of-way, thereby releasing them from the national railbank,
regardless of when physical abandonment as a railroad occurred.... Underlying our
holding is our legal conclusion that appellants' possessory rights in the rights-of-way are
defined, inter alia, by federal statutes in effect at the time of their purchase.
Id. at *19.
99. See Preseault v. United States, 66 F.3d 1190, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
100. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
101. Judge Plager wrote the plurality opinion for the court, joined by three judges; Judge
Rader filed a concurring opinion joined by one judge; and Judge Clevenger filed a dissent joined
by two judges. See id. at 1528.
102. See id. at 1533.
103. See id. at 1534. As to the interests created by the original transfers to the railroad in
1898, the court held that the rights-of-way were indeed easements. Despite a lack of documen-
tation for two of the three parcels and what appears to be a warranty deed conveying a fee
simple estate for a right-of-way over the third parcel, the court found that:
With few exceptions the Vermont cases are consistent in holding that, practically
without regard to the documentation and the manner of acquisition, when a railroad for
its purposes acquires an estate in land for laying track and operating railroad
equipment thereon, the estate acquired is no more than that needed for the purpose,
and that typically means an easement, not a fee simple estate.
Id. at 1535.
104. See id. at 1533.
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law, without regard to the question of federal preemption. As to
whether the scope of the easement contemplated recreational trails,
the plurality and the dissent sharply disputed the existence in
Vermont of the "shifting public use doctrine," which allows a change
in the use of a public easement (such as a railroad easement) to
another public use (such as a recreational trail).0 5 The plurality held
that the doctrine did not exist in Vermont and as a matter of law the
use of a railroad easement for a nature trail did not fall within the
scope of an easement for railroad purposes. 10 6 As for the supposed
abandonment of the easement, the court held that as a matter of state
common law the easement was abandoned in 1975 when the tracks
were removed. 0 7 Thus, according to the Federal Circuit, a taking
occurred when the state reentered the property to establish a bicycle
and pedestrian path in 1985 over the long-abandoned railroad
easement.
The concurring opinion, like Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Preseault v. ICC, began with the undisputed assertion that the analy-
sis of a takings claim under the Rails-to-Trails Act starts with state-
defined property rights.08  Again mirroring Justice O'Connor's
opinion, the concurring opinion implicitly argues for a per se analy-
sis. 10 9 In fact, the concurrence found that in addition to the Rails-to-
Trails Act, both the 4-R Act and the Transportation Act of 1920 coun-
tenance takings."10
Like the plurality opinion, the concurrence found that aban-
donment was a question of fact under state law, and therefore federal
law was irrelevant to the analysis. Similarly, based on the facts, the
concurring opinion found abandonment when the Vermont Railway
105. See id. at 1541-44 (Plager, J.), 1568-75 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the shifting public use doctrine, see sources cited in the opinion; see also Jeffery Alan Bandini,
Comment, The Acquisition, Abandonment, and Preservation of Rail Corridors in North
Carolina: A Historical Review and Contemporary Analysis, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1989, 2026-28
(1997); Wright, supra note 69, at 755-57.
106. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1541-44.
107. See id. at 1544-49. In focusing on the removal of the tracks, the court ignored explicit
language in the House Report accompanying the Rails-to-Trails Act providing that the "right-of-
way can be maintained for future railroad use even though service is discontinued and tracks
removed." H.R. REP. No. 98-28, at 9 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 112, 120.
108. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1552 (Rader, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 1553.
110. Id. This Author believes that Judge Rader is the first judge in the almost 80 years
since the Transportation Act of 1920 was enacted to find that it violates the Fifth Amendment.
Although this is a surprising conclusion, it is the logical extension of Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion in Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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removed the tracks and a taking upon the establishment of a recrea-
tional trail."'
The dissenting opinion, though reaching a contrary conclusion
on the abandonment issue and the takings claim, is equally un-
persuasive. By finding that the state did not abandon the easement
under state law, the dissent ignored the federal role in regulating
interstate commerce.12 After finding that the easement continued to
exist, the dissent applied both the "shifting public use doctrine" under
Vermont common law and a state preservation statute to conclude
that no taking occurred."'
IV. ACHIEVING CONSTITUTIONAL CONSISTENCY
A. The Abandonment
In short, the court in Preseault v. United States held that the
Vermont Railway abandoned the state's easement for railroad pur-
poses under state law ten years before Vermont established a trail on
the right-of-way. Thus, the court did not specifically address whether
the Rails-to-Trails Act could prevent abandonment without violating
the Fifth Amendment. Instead, the court found that reestablishment
of the easement after ten years constituted a taking. The court de-
cided that abandonment occurred under state law despite exclusive
federal jurisdiction over railroad abandonments under the
Transportation Act of 1920, the language in the Rails-to-Trails Act
evidencing congressional intent to delay abandonment of railroad
rights-of-way, and the scope of congressional power under the
Commerce and Supremacy Clauses. The court also ignored numerous
federal decisions finding federal preemption of state law, including
one recent case finding "consummation of abandonment" of a railroad
easement only after the ICC had approved the abandonment and the
railroad manifested its intent to abandon the easement, despite
cessation of operations six years earlier and the removal of tracks."1
111. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1554.
112. See id. at 1558-75 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 1566-76.
114. See Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Grantwood Village v.
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 95 F.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that federal law preempts state
law on question of abandonment); National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (holding that state law cannot cause reverter of railroad right-of-way prior to ICC-
approved abandonment); Schneider v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 864 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Neb. 1994)
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The court confused its analysis of the impact of federal legisla-
tion on the alleged taking with the impact of federal legislation on
abandonment of the easement. The two are separate issues. In fact,
the court admitted as much in its opinion. 115 While citing dicta from
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Preseault v. ICC for the proposition
that state law defines the property interest in a takings claim,116 the
court without analysis ignored the impact of federal legislation on
abandonment of the easement, assuming without explanation that
state law controlled. 117 Thus, the court ignored the conclusion that
within the federal regulatory scheme under the Constitution, federal
law controls the issue of abandonment. By forcing the square peg of
state law into the round hole of federal railroad regulation in the
interest of interstate commerce, the court avoided unambiguous
c-ongressional language prohibiting abandonment of the right-of-
way."18
The court's holding that state law controls the issue of aban-
donment of the right-of-way is contrary to Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce and preempt state law under the
Constitution. As noted above, Congress enacted the Transportation
Act for the specific purpose of preempting any state law that
interferes with interstate commerce-that is, to preempt laws that
prevent railroads from abandoning rail service." 9 The purpose of the
Transportation Act would be subverted unless federal law also
preempted state property law that interferes with interstate
commerce by forcing railroads or their successors to abandon rail
corridors still subject to future reactivation as part of the national
transportation system; federal jurisdiction over rail service is
(holding that federal law preempts state law in context of Rails-to-Trails Act); Chevy Chase
Land Co. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 545, 580 (1997) (finding abandonment on date of ICC
approval). But see McKinley v. Waterloo R.R., 368 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Iowa 1985) (holding that
federal law regulating railroad abandonments does not preempt state law); Lawson v. State, 730
P.2d 1308, 1316-17 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (finding that federal law regulating railroad
abandonments does not preempt state law).
115. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1537 (en banc) ("[Hiaving and exercising
the power of preemption is one thing; being free of the Constitutional obligation to pay just
compensation for the state-created rights thus destroyed is another.").
116. See id. at 1537.
117. See id. at 1544-49 (discussing abandonment).
118. By finding abandonment of the easement before the right-of-way was converted to a
trail, the court avoided applying the provision of the Rails-to-Trails Act that states "such interim
use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of
such rights-of-way for railroad purposes." 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (Supp. II 1996).
119. See SHARFMAN, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing authority of ICC over abandonments).
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meaningless without concurrent jurisdiction over the underlying
property interest.
Allowing railroad easements to be abandoned under state
property law effectively takes the rail corridor out of the national
transportation system without the consent of the STB. Permitting
state law to determine the disposition of property interests denies the
federal government its ability to determine which lines are necessary
for present and future rail use. The result is the loss of "valuable
national asset[s]" 120 in the face of increasing population density and
urban areas literally choking on traffic congestion. The same problem
of state interference with efficient transportation that Congress faced
in 1920 is just as relevant today. Any doubt as to the congressional
intent behind the Rails-to-Trails Act is removed by the clear language
of the Act and the accompanying legislative history.121 Perhaps
through confusion, the Federal Circuit did not consider the impact of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause in deciding the issue of
abandonment.
This Note advocates an analysis of abandonment that is con-
sistent with the Commerce Clause and the Fifth Amendment. The
analysis begins with state property law, but does not end there. The
first step should be a determination of the property interest at issue.
If the right-of-way is a fee simple estate, the analysis ends, because
only one party, the owner, has an interest in the land. On the other
hand, if a court finds that the right-of-way is an easement, the deter-
mining factor in light of federal railroad regulation would be whether
the STB has granted a certificate of abandonment with respect to the
rail line. If the STB has not done so, the right-of-way is still a part of
the national transportation system, subject to reactivation for future
use, even if the interim use is for a bicycle and pedestrian trail pursu-
ant to the Rails-to-Trails Act. Conversely, if abandonment has been
sought by any interested party and approved by the STB after the
requisite determination of public necessity and convenience, courts
should consider the line to be outside the jurisdiction of the federal
government and no longer part of the national transportation system.
State law would then determine the disposition of the rail corridor. A
contrary conclusion denies the federal government its ability to effec-
tively regulate interstate commerce and ignores the plain language of
the Rails-to-Trails Act. Under the court's holding in Preseault v.
United States, railbanking is impossible; presently unused rail corri-
120. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
121. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
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dors cannot be maintained except by incurring the huge expense of
leaving valuable equipment and track in place.
Since the power to regulate abandonments of rail service
would be incomplete without the concomitant power to regulate the
property interest upon which present or future rail service depends,
the proposition that state law determines the disposition of rail corri-
dors still within the jurisdiction of the STB is incompatible with the
STB's responsibility to effectively regulate the nation's rail system.
The Supreme Court has found this to be within Congress's power.
122
Because Congress has expressed its will in unambiguous language,
and clearly has the power under the Commerce and Supremacy
Clauses, state law should simply be inoperative until the federal
government terminates jurisdiction over the rail corridor pursuant to
the Transportation Act.
B. The Taking
The Federal Circuit's finding of an abandonment under state
law enabled the court to avoid applying the Rails-to-Trails Act. By
ignoring the federal role in regulating abandonments, the Federal
Circuit found that a taking occurred when the state reentered the
property to establish a recreational trail ten years after the Vermont
Railway abandoned the easement under state law.123 Thus, by apply-
ing state law to find an abandonment well before the establishment of
the trail, the court was able to ignore express congressional intent
and statutory language providing that "interim use [as a trail] shall
not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an aban-
donment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes."124
According to the Federal Circuit, reestablishment of a previously
abandoned right-of-way constituted the taking, not the interim trail
use of a viable rail corridor still under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
25
By finding the establishment of a new easement, the Federal
Circuit characterized the occupation by the state as a permanent
physical taking, and applied the per se rule of Loretto, rather than the
122. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. at 17-19.
123. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1544-45, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (Supp. H 1996).
125. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1550 (stating that the trail constituted "a
new easement for the new use, constituting a physical taking of the right of exclusive possession
that belonged to the Preseaults").
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Penn Central balancing test applied by the Claims Court.26 The per
se rule, however, is inappropriate for several reasons. First, the
easement continued to exist under federal law, and thus the recrea-
tional trail did not create a new restriction. Second, the limitation on
the disposition of the easement was a by-product of federal railroad
regulation, rather than an end in itself. Third, delayed abandonment
under the Rails-to-Trails Act would not have been permanent. 127
Fourth, the establishment of a recreational trail did not physically
displace the Preseaults; they never actually occupied the land in
question. Fifth, the trail was not shown to increase the burden on the
servient estate. Finally, even conservatives such as Justice Scalia
would not find a per se taking when a preexisting limitation is ex-
tended.128 As a result, Penn Central should apply.
Under the first prong of the Penn Central test-determining
the nature of the government action-the Rails-to-Trails Act clearly
meets the standard for a taking because the Act authorizes physical
occupation of the right-of-way.129 Under the second prong of the Penn
Central test, however, the landowners will almost never be able to
show a regulatory taking because pervasive federal regulation of
railroad abandonments has left most landowners without any reason-
able investment-backed expectations in railroad rights-of-way. 30 The
third prong of the test-the economic impact of the government ac-
tion-would require a further factual inquiry to determine the value
of the right-of-way and the diminution of the property value due to
the perpetuation of the right-of-way. Doubt exists, however, whether
the perpetuation of an already existing easement would diminish the
value of the land to any significant extent. Since a plaintiff must
prove all three factors to show a taking, delayed abandonment under
the Act will almost never be a taking. 3' By applying Loretto, as op-
posed to Penn Central, the court in effect decided that investment-
backed expectations and diminished value are irrelevant to the de-
termination.
126. See id. at 1544-45 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982)).
127. See Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 95 (1992) ("The Penn Central approach
applies in this case because any taking would not be deemed permanent. Each lease is for five
years up to a maximum renewal period of 30 years, and a request to reactivate railroad
operations can be made at any time."); see also Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d at 1555 n.1
(Clevenger, J., dissenting) (discussing lease).
128. See supra note 54.
129. See Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. at 95.
130. This is effectively the holding of the Court of Federal Claims that was overruled by the
Federal Circuit. See id. at 95-96.
131. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (applying Penn Central).
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Separate from investment-backed expectations and diminished
value is the assumption by the court that the Preseaults had a com-
pensable property interest taken. As noted above, the establishment
of a trail did not physically displace the Preseaults. In this case, the
predecessors to the Preseaults already received compensation for
granting the right-of-way over their land either through direct
purchase by the Rutland-Canadian Railroad or through eminent do-
main proceedings.132 The Preseaults knowingly purchased their land
subject to the restriction in the deed, presumably paying less for the
land than they would for similar land not subject to a railroad ease-
ment. Far from preventing a taking without compensation, the court
provided a windfall to the Preseaults.
Another source of confusion is the nature of the property inter-
est held by the servient owner. As noted above, easements do not
create a future interest in land; the interest of the easement holder is
a present interest in the fee subject to an easement. 133 The Federal
Circuit recognized the distinction but, relying on the dicta in Justice
O'Connor's minority opinion in Preseault v. ICC, came to the conclu-
sion that the present interests of the Preseaults in the easement were
destroyed.134 In reality, the Preseaults maintained the same interest
in the land they always had-they still owned their land in fee simple
subject to a railroad easement. Moreover, since railroad easements
are exclusive occupancy easements, the interim trail use of the rail-
banked easement is on its face less burdensome than the continuing
present use of the easement for actual railroad operations.
Perpetuating an easement under the Rails-to-Trails Act by delaying
abandonment actually maintains the present interest, rather than
effecting a taking by destroying a present or future interest.
The court's alternate ground for a taking was that the scope of
the easement for railroad purposes did not encompass use of the
property for recreational trails, because the "shifting public use
doctrine" did not exist under Vermont law.1 5 That argument is not
convincing, however, once one realizes that the Rails-to-Trails Act
includes future railroad use as a railroad purpose and that the estab-
lishment of a recreational trail could actually be less burdensome
132. Of the three parcels containing a right-of-way acquired by the Preseaults, two were
condemned through eminent domain and one was purchased through contract. See Preseault v.
United States, 100 F.3d at 1534-37.
133. See id. at 1533-34 (explaining the difference between reversion and relief from the
burden of an easement).
134. See id. at 1550-51.
135. See id. at 1550.
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than an active railroad easement, most notably because the character-
istic of exclusive occupancy disappears. Thus, there is no "shift" in
use because the easement is still being used for a railroad purpose,
and there is no taking because the additional use is less burdensome
than the original use for rail traffic. On the other hand, if the Penn
Central test is met, and the facts and circumstances of a particular
case warrant a finding that a trail is more burdensome than railroad
use, landowners are justified in claiming compensation for the in-
creased burden.136
Considered objectively, the Rails-to-Trails Act does not attempt
to redefine state property rights. Rather, it broadens the definition of
railroad purpose to include railbanking and interim trail use in order
to regulate interstate commerce. Even before the Rails-to-Trails Act,
state law could not affect railroads under the "exclusive and plenary
jurisdiction" of the ICC. The broader definition of rail purpose pro-
vided in the Act is necessary to accommodate changing transportation
priorities in modern America. Interpreted in the context of the
Commerce Clause, the Rails-to-Trails Act does not conflict with state
property law; easements are still subject to termination under state
law once the state regains jurisdiction from the federal government.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note advocates that state law simply cannot operate to
terminate a railroad easement while the federal government retains
jurisdiction over the rail corridor under the Transportation Act of
1920. Controversy surrounding trail use under the Rails-to-Trails Act
should not undermine the responsibility of the federal government to
maintain rail corridors for present and future use. Prior to Preseault
v. United States, states simply accepted the fact that they did not
have jurisdiction over rail corridors still subject to ICC control.137
136. See I.F. REDFIELD, THE LAW OF RAILWAYS 269 (6th ed. 1888), quoted in Wright, supra
note 69, at 756 ("The mere possibility of reverter to the original owner, or his heirs or grantees,
is not regarded... as any appreciable interest requiring to be compensated.... The most the
owner of the fee could claim in such case is to recover compensation for any additional land
taken, and for any additional burden imposed upon the land appropriated.").
137. See, e.g., Trustees of the Diocese v. State, 496 A.2d 151, 152 (Vt. 1985) (referring to
Vermont's argument that ICC approval was required before a railroad may be abandoned).
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Preseault v. United States threatens not only efforts to preserve rail
corridors for future use, but also the viability of federal control over
interstate commerce.
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